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The paper reviews the prominent features of 
a continuous, combinatorial auction. A brief 
discussion of background material helps draw 
distinctions between auction architectures. 
Background definitions, rules, and operational 
features define the auction in Section II. Testing 
and performance are outlined in Section III.
I. Background
The use of auctions to solve allocation 
 problems among items exhibiting complemen-
tarities was first addressed in 1978 by Grether, 
Isaac, and Plott (1989) who studied the allo-
cation of airport landing rights to airlines that 
operated at multiple airports and placed value on 
routes as opposed to operations at a single air-
port. Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982), moti-
vated by the Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1989) 
research, connected bids with “either/or” and 
“and” constraints thus combining bids into a 
package. The ideas were generalized by Banks, 
Ledyard, and Porter (1989) to include the con-
cept of a “standby queue.” These auctions oper-
ated as sealed bid auctions or as a series of sealed 
bid auctions that operated in  discrete rounds.
The first example of a continuous combi-
natorial auction is found in Brewer and Plott (1996), who represented the allocation problem 
in terms of binary confects of packages that cre-
ated both the flexibility for widespread appli-
cation and the computational speed required 
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to support a  continuous auction. They applied 
the mechanism to the allocation of the rights to 
operate trains on a fixed set of tracks in Sweden. 
A package was a function in time and space 
describing the scheduled location of a train. 
The intersection of two packages represented 
a scheduled crash between trains that must be 
avoided, hence the term “binary” in the paper 
title. The computer could quickly compute non-
intersecting packages that maximized the value 
of the sale and permitted the auction to proceed 
as a type of continuous, simultaneous, ascend-
ing price  auction. The  non-intersecting pack-
ages that produced the most revenue from the 
auction were declared the leading bids at each 
instant of time. That first mechanism was fol-
lowed by slight generalization to a procurement 
problem in which the buyer organized sellers to 
minimize procurement cost and sellers could 
offer  endogenous packages of backhaul services (Brewer and Plott 2002). The organization was a 
simultaneous, decreasing price auction.
In the 1990s, the FCC was considering 
the adoption of a combinatorial auction as a 
replacement for the simultaneous, rounds-based, 
ascending price auction that the FCC had used 
to auction parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (Plott and Salmon 2004). One option studied 
was a hybrid process that consisted of rounds 
followed by a continuous phase (Plott 2000). 
Experiments with the hybrid revealed that most 
of the adjustment and efficiency came from the 
continuous phase, a discovery that led to the 
renewed study of combinatorial auctions that 
operated only in continuous time.
II. Definitions and Rules
Items.—The set of n items is denoted by 
Y = {1, 2, … , n}; Let S ∈ { 0, 1 } n be a combina-
tion, set, or package of items.
Individuals.—The set of m individuals is 
M = {1, 2, … , m}.
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Bids.—A bid is a price and a package of items 
of the form b j 
i (S ) where i is the index of the 
individual submitting the bid, j is the bid number 
as recorded in the system, and S ⊆ Y is a pack-
age of items. So,  b q 
i
 (Sq) is bid number q, where 
i is the bidder and Sq ∈ {0, 1 } n . That is, the q th 
bid was placed by i, for a dollar amount  b q 
i
 for a 
package of items Sq.
Bid Properties.—Bids are submitted under 
“all or none” conditions. Either the entire pack-
age is accepted as a provisional winner or none 
of it is accepted. Multiple bids can be tendered 
within “either/or” constraints. All bids remain 
in the system and can be selected as provisional 
winners unless cancelled. Provisional winning 
bids cannot be cancelled.
Provisional Winners.—When the auction 
ends the provisional winners become winners 
and pay the amount of the bid. After each bid is 
submitted, the system publishes the set of provi-
sionally winning bids.
Provisional Winner Determination.—The 
provisional winners are bids in the set of bids 
that would maximize the value of the sale if the 
auction concluded at that moment subject to the 
condition that no item is contained in more than 
one provisionally winning bid.
B = all bids submitted and not cancelled. 
xq ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether or not the q th bid 
was accepted as a provisional winner of the 
auction.
W = Provisionally winning bids. Provisional 
winners are the subset of all bids, B, that maxi-
mize the value of the sale subject to the fact that 
no item is contained in more than one provi-
sional winning bid. That is, provisional winning 
bids are q: xq = arg max R.
R =  max  
 x q : q∈B   ∑  x q  b q i  
 
 Subject to  ∑ 
 x q S q 
 
 ≤ (1, 1, 1, … , 1)
Non-Provisional Winning Bids.—The bids that 
are not provisional winners remain in the system 
and play an important role. The computation of 
the provisional winners includes an examina-
tion of all bids in the system.  Non-winning bids 
exist in the system as potential partners or as the 
pieces of a complex coalition that can be assem-
bled to replace large package bids as provisional 
winners. Depending on the timing of the place-
ment of a non-winning bid, the bidder is reveal-
ing a maximum willingness to pay.
Increment Requirements.—The function of 
the increment rule is to encourage bids to move 
the system to an equilibrium and to do so at a 
fast pace. Let v(S ) be the maximum value for 
which the set S could be sold given the bids in 
the system. It is determined by computing the 
winning bids from all bids submitted given 
that the sale of items was restricted to the set 
S. Let k be the (constant) increment required 
for bidding on a single item. For a bid b(S) to 
meet the increment, it must meet the condition 
b(S ) ≥ v(S) + k | S |.
Stopping Rules.—Two clocks are used: a new 
bid clock and a new provisional winner clock. The 
new bid clock resets with each new bid and starts 
a countdown. The new winner clock resets each 
time a bid is placed that determines a new pattern 
of provisional winners. The auction ends if either 
clock reaches zero. Basically, the new bid clock 
forces a flow of bids, similar to offers in a nego-
tiation and does so under the threat of the auction 
ending. The new winner clock forces concessions 
of sufficient magnitude to advance the value of 
the sale. In essence, the new bid clock says “You 
must make an offer” and the new winner clock 
says “You must make an offer sufficiently to get a 
deal done or the auction ends anyway.” Thus, the 
ultimatum feature of game theory is operational 
in both clocks. The system is constantly pressing 
for revenue gains by using the threat of ending the 
auction. While bidders who are not provisional 
winners do face a dominant strategy of bidding 
as the clock counts down, bids need not be large 
and there is no advantage to waiting until the last 
moment to bid. Last moment bids just give com-
petitors more time.
Information, feedback and tools for fashion-
ing bids are important.
Provisional Winners Table.—A table is pub-
lished that contains the provisional winner of 
each item, whether the provisionally winning 
bid is a package bid or a single and the high-
est bid placed on the item as a single. The table 
is updated with each new provisionally win-
ning bid accompanied by a small red dot that 
disappears in a few seconds. New non-winning 
bids are shown as a small black dot on the 
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 provisionally winning table. The dots also disap-
pear after a few seconds. These black dots signal 
that a bidder that wants part of a package has not 
bid enough to become a provisional winner and 
seeks partners to bid on the rest of the package 
of which the bidder wants a portion. The black 
dots carry information that serves to coordinate 
bidding by coalitions of small bidders who want 
to break up a large package bid.
All Bids Table.—A page of all bids in the sys-
tem is published.
Query.—The query system and related func-
tionality serve to replace the role of item prices 
in the fashioning of bids. When a bidder selects a 
package for a potential bid, the bidder is immedi-
ately shown both the minimum amount that can 
be bid as dictated by the increment requirements 
and the minimum amount it would take for the 
bid to become a provisional winner. By adding 
or removing items from a package, the query can 
be used to determine the marginal cost of adding 
items to a package. By removing items from a 
package, the bid can “fit” better with other bids 
and the price required to become a provisional 
winner can be significantly reduced.
Show as Winning.—After a bid is fashioned 
but before it is submitted, the bidder can choose 
this option to display the pattern of winning and 
non-winning bids that will be the consequence of 
the submission. It will show all new provisional 
winners, all bids that were provisional winners 
and remain as such, all bids that were provisional 
winners and now are not, and all bids that were 
not provisional winners and would be provisional 
winners if the bid was submitted. This supports 
coordination by allowing bidders to search more 
efficiently for partners and avoid adding items to 
a package that would be too costly.
III. Performance
Mechanism testing used experimental eco-
nomics testbed procedures in which the experi-
menter has control of the number of items, 
the number of bidders, and the preferences of 
individual bidders that dictate the nature of 
synergies, nonconvexities, and the coordina-
tion required for efficiency. Since individual 
preferences are known to the experimenter, the 
efficiency of an allocation resulting from the 
auction can be computed as the sum of values 
of items to the acquiring bidders divided by the 
maximum possible.
Testbed methods operate under conditions 
in which theory is suggestive but limited. 
Because the theory is incomplete and is vul-
nerable to a variety of sources of rejection, two 
experimental questions are posed in a testbed. (i) Does the mechanism do what it is supposed 
to do? The question asks for a demonstration 
of proof of principle. (ii) Does the mechanism 
do it for understandable reasons? The question 
asks about a test of design consistency. The 
question asks if the result reflects the (limited) 
theory that was used in the design or are they 
simply random? Clearly, this is a basic ques-
tion because it asks about the possibility that 
the design will scale. Of course, this second 
question is a key. It asks about the robust-
ness of the theory when applied to possibly 
unknown conditions. It calls for tests under a 
variety of environments that could challenge 
the performance.
The test environments might look nothing at 
all like “the real world” because the real world in 
which one might imagine the mechanism being 
deployed might not have conditions that theory 
suggests are stressful. On the other hand, test-
ing in environments that might closely resemble 
the application environment might prove valu-
able in uncovering interactions with institutions 
and aspects of the environment that might not 
be anticipated by theory. Institutional facts and 
environmental features can interact in surprising 
ways and have negative effects on performance. 
Examples of both types of environments are 
reported in the second section.
Four classes of parameters existed for stress 
tests of the mechanism. The easiest test involved 
no synergies. A second test involved twenty 
items to be allocated to five bidders. Each bid-
der had preferences for all items but received 
only four items in the efficient allocation. A 
third environment added three bidders to the 
second environment with the resulting efficient 
allocation assigning parts of each of the five 
to accommodate additional bidders. This third 
environment is viewed as a complex fitting 
problem. A fourth environment expanded scale 
by replicating the smaller environments.
Experiments revealed that understanding 
induced preferences and familiarity with the 
functionality of the auction process were major 
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contributors to any observed lack of efficiency. 
Trained subjects operated at near 100 percent 
efficiency and scale presented no problems.
The time series of total revenues of two field 
applications are reported in Figures 1 and 2. The 
results of an auction for 100 metric ton pallets 
of natural rubber are contained in Figure 1. Four 
Internet bidders located around the world com-
peted for 22 pallets of natural rubber located 
in a warehouse in Vietnam. The auction was 
conducted by the United Nations International 
Natural Rubber Organization, which had accu-
mulated the pallets as part of a price stabiliza-
tion program and was prepared to release the 
natural rubber back to private companies. Buyer 
identities were not public information. The 
 pallets were from different plantations. Natural 
 rubber from a given plantation is a homogeneous 
 product, but rubber from different plantations 
has different and well known qualities. Starting 
bids were tendered by bidders as sealed bids and 
are similar to other sealed bids that the adminis-
trator for the INRO auction had observed were 
approximately market prices that exist in public 
markets. Package bidding followed quickly after 
the initial bids. Some bidders expressed values 
for rubber from a limited set of plantations and 
others seemed to be interested in a mix with 
some sensitivity to price and quantity. The black 
dots appeared throughout the auction, signaling 
a bid on part of an existing larger package bid. 
If the starting revenue of $884,975 is assumed to 
be the revenue that would have been produced by 
a sealed bid when compared with the $927,000 
auction revenue, the combinatorial auction pro-
duced about 5.5 percent more revenue.
The second field application is an auction 
for aquaculture sites located in Port Phillip Bay 
near Melbourne, Australia. The sites are appro-
priate for the growing of bivalve shellfish. The 
state of Victoria decided to auction 18 sites. A 
total of ten bidders participated and bid for 18 
sites. Seven bidders were winners producing 
$575,000 in revenue. The sites were scattered 
across six locations. Bidders were interested in 
scale since they must meet regular demand for 
deliveries. They are also interested in a portfo-
lio of sites reflecting a diversity of location due 
to currents, winds, possible diseases, and loca-
tion relative to home base and delivery points. 
Thus, multiple synergies existed and package 
bids were used frequently.
The two field applications have simi-
lar properties. Both lasted about two hours. 
Bidding in the aquaculture auction was about 
three times the speed of bidding in the natu-
ral rubber auctions. There was also a larger 
percentage of  non-winning bids (21 percent 
versus 13 percent) suggesting more aggressive 
attempts to coordinate. The larger number of 
bidders and the facts that the bidders were bet-
ter trained and all at one location could account 
for the difference. The proportion of combi-
nation bids is about 25 percent–30 percent in 
both auctions so the package bidding was a 
valuable tool. The numbers of queries per bid 
are 2 per bid for the natural rubber auction and 
3.2 per bid in the aquaculture auction suggest-
ing a harder “fitting” or “coordination” prob-
lem existed in the aquaculture auction. The 
pace of bidding starts fast in both auctions and 
slows dramatically at the end. This property is 
evident in both figures.
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bidders 18 sites for growing 
bivalve shellfish, June 2006.
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An action every 25.2 seconds on average.
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Figure 2
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IV. Observations
Several features of the mechanism are worth 
emphasis. The reader should notice that con-
cepts typical of rounds bids such as eligibility, 
activity, and package prices based on sums of 
items prices are all absent. The absence of a 
concept of a price per item is a departure from 
tradition. Replacing the measures contained in 
prices are queries and displays that can respond 
to human pattern recognition and crafted infor-
mation needs. The use of clocks carries key 
public information and creates the proper level 
of incentives for coordination. A bidder needs 
only to meet an increment requirement to keep 
a negotiation alive before facing an all or none 
choice of implementing a “contribution” to the 
public good of breaking up a large bid or collec-
tions of bids and becoming a provisional winner. 
The dots provide feedback by calling attention 
to actions of others and the possible intentions 
that underlay the actions of others play. This 
type of information that contributes to coali-
tion formation plays a key role and renewal of 
the “free rider” problem Computational prob-
lems can clearly pose problems as the size of 
the auction grows. The testbed methods have 
some departures from what an untutored theo-
rist might expect. The methods are designed to 
address problems where the theory is not com-
plete and might be no more than suggestive. 
Classical statistical tests of such theories do not 
make much sense if research is confronted by 
a scale of limited budget, limited time, and an 
unbounded infinity of variables. Yet, the role 
of theory plays a fundamental role. Theory, 
regardless of how incomplete it might be, is 
the tool that takes the analysis from the limited 
 observations under controlled conditions to the 
substantially unknown conditions of the field. 
The theory must be robust and the testbeds help 
with the necessary judgments.
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